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INTRODUCTION
The importance of "the local" (local ownership, local values, local practices, etc.) is an increasingly common trope in post-conflict peacebuilding and transitional justice discourse.
1 While transitional justice solutions have at times been imposed from the outside, it is now acknowledged that the United Nations (UN) must better support "local ownership" in matters of post-conflict justice and that "due regard" must be given to local justice and reconciliation traditions. 2 Paeans to the value of the local in policy circles are paralleled by a growing body of scholarship on the topic that has sought to explore the complexities of bringing dimensions of the local from the periphery to the foreground of transitional justice work. 3 Put succinctly, the current moment in transitional justice is marked by a veritable "fascination with locality." 4 While the reasons for this growing attention are complex, it could be said to reflect the commonsense understanding that peace processes and justice mechanisms not embraced by those who have to live with them are unlikely to be successful in the long term. 5 Interventions perceived as being imposed "from the outside" may spark backlash and resentment that undermines both legitimacy and effectiveness. 6 In that sense, grappling with the dilemmas of the oppressive power structures, some of which may have led to the conflict in the first place. 15 For these and others reasons, there is a deep distrust of local agency in the post-conflict context. 16 Ultimately, the dilemmas of the local therefore reflect a clash of normative commitments: between liberal internationalism and international human rights on the one hand, and principles of local sovereignty and autonomy on the other. 17 The result of this ambivalence, as played out through global-local power disparities, has typically been accommodation of the local to the extent of conformity with the global, co-option and not co-existence. 18 Conflicting commitments call for a complicated balancing act. In some contexts, too much local may be as problematic as too much global. 19 While it may be an all-but-impossible needle to thread, 20 finding the right balance between global and local agency, priorities, practices, and values stands out as one of the key policy challenges of 21 st century transitional justice. 21 To this end, this Article seeks to analyze and deconstruct the concept of the local in the transitional justice context, exploring its promises and pitfalls. In doing so, I attempt to make three key points. emerge, they often take forms that do not conform to Western ethnical ideals or international legal principles."). 15 See Patricia Lundy, Paradoxes and Challenges of Transitional Justice at the "Local" Level: Historical Enquiries in Northern Ireland, 6 CONTEMP. SOCIAL SCI. 89, 93 (2011) (reviewing arguments in the literature that "transitional justice can be used by elites for a variety of purposes and to serve or conceal other very different political agendas."). 16 Florian Kuhn, The Peace Prefix: Ambiguities of the Word Peace, 19 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 396, 402 (2012) . 17 See Donais, supra note 5, at 755-56. Global frictions arise in part due to a clash between universalism and particularism-a dynamic at the heart of the cultural relativism debate in human rights. Yet it is important to note here that values like participation, inclusion, and local agency are themselves often held out as universal values intended to trump others, and at times are even as a shield against local or traditional practices that might discriminate or otherwise fail to be fully inclusive. Thus, the clash of normative commitments I speak of here is much more complex than frictions between a cosmopolitan liberalism and vigorous localism, and could also be thought of a tension between different (purportedly universal) liberal commitments. 18 See Stephanie Vieille, Transitional Justice: A Colonizing Field?, 4 AMSTERDAM L.F. 58, 66 (2012) . 19 See Donais, supra note 9, at 21. 20 First, a better understanding of the role of the local in transitional justice discourse and practice requires that we think carefully about why transitional justice should have so often become the locus for such vivid global-local tensions in the first place. While cautioning against unduly rigid notions of path dependency, I offer the historical and ideological origins of transitional justice in Western liberalism and legalism as one partial explanation for the global-local "friction" experienced today. 22 I also sketch the contours of several decades of transitional justice practice to highlight the continued relevance of those origins.
Second, because concepts like local ownership present a loose and often confusing theme in academic and policy discourse that subsumes a wide range of critiques and concerns, understanding global-local dilemmas requires one to unpack the concept, distinguishing concerns about actual control (agency, decision making, funding), process (bottom-up, participatory, homegrown), and substance (values, practices, priorities), even if those concerns are in practice highly related. Given the rise of transitional justice interventions in recent decades, tensions and conflict between global and local will inevitably continue for the foreseeable future. At the same time, approaches to postconflict justice that take into account the need for a better global-local balance along the multiple axes of local ownership (control, process, and substance) may help to generate new and innovative approaches to trying to achieve peace with justice in the wake of mass atrocity that take us beyond the increasingly rote transitional justice "toolbox." 23 Finally, I observe that breaking down concepts like local ownership tends to destabilize, deconstructing simple binary notions of global and local. In reality, transitional justice processes typically involve complicated interplay between multiple varied levels, resulting in a dialectic process where global and local are transformed by their encounter with each other. 24 This has led 22 As PEACEKEEPING 137, 139 (2013) . 23 The phrase "transitional justice toolbox" refers to the mechanisms and interventions most associated with the field: prosecutions, truth telling, reparations, vetting and dismissals, institutional reform, etc. The toolbox metaphor is increasingly critiqued as suggesting a set, one-size-fits-all template ignorant of context, and because the tool idea implies that transitional justice interventions are somehow neutral, acultural, and apolitical. Lieselotte Viaene & Eva Brems, Transitional Justice and Cultural Contexts: Learning from the Universality Debate, 28 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 199, 200 (2010) . 24 See Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism and Transnational Culture: The Ka Ho'okolokolonui Kanaka Maoli Tribunal, Hawai'i, 1993 , in HUMAN RIGHTS, CULTURE & CONTEST: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES some scholars to question the value of the concept of the local, arguing instead for more complicated notions of "glocality," "translocality," and "local and larger local." 25 Yet as an ideal, the concept of the local continues to provide an important counterweight to the centralizing and universalizing tendencies of transitional justice and liberal international peacebuilding more generally. Concepts of local and global therefore retain utility for purposes of both analysis and policymaking, even if they do not accurately describe the full complexity of transitional justice processes.
This Article consists of four parts. In Part I, I examine the ideological and historical origins of the field of transitional justice, with a view to how these origins have shaped some of the boundaries, tensions, and dilemmas of field. In Part II, I discuss some of the frequent critiques of mainstream transitional justice practice, particularly the idea that it is largely a top-down and statecentric enterprise that pays insufficient attention to questions of local ownership, agency, priorities, practices, and values. In Part III, I examine some of the promises and pitfalls of greater engagement with the local in matters of transitional justice. In Part IV, I argue for the need to break down concepts of local ownership as a means of striking a better global-local balance.
I. THE HISTORICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
Transitional justice can be conceived of as a set of moral, legal, and political dilemmas involving how best to respond to mass atrocities and other forms of profound injustice in the wake of conflict or in times of political transition. 26 It is often defined in part by reference to a set of practicesincluding prosecutions, truth-seeking, vetting and dismissals, reparations, and institutional reform-now associated with responses to widespread human 30 rights violations. 27 In the last three decades, these practices have become increasingly widespread. Priscilla Hayner, for example, has documented the existence of some 40 modern-day truth commissions. 28 Kathryn Sikkink has demonstrated an increasing crescendo of human rights prosecutions taking place at national and international levels leading, she argues, to the emergence of a new global norm of accountability, at least for certain harms. 29 In a relatively brief span of history, therefore, transitional justice has in a sense gone mainstream, with the question no longer being whether there will be some kind of transitional justice, but what particular interventions will be deployed, and what their scope and sequencing might look like. 30 Though it continues to be shaped by the broader field of international human rights, transitional justice has emerged as its own field of theory, policy, and practice, with dedicated NGOs, job descriptions, academic journals, and itinerant expert consultants.
31
Practices now associated with what we call transitional justice can be traced back millennia, 32 yet the origins of the modern field have firm roots in the 1980s and 90s and the attempts of nascent democracies during the so-called "third-wave" of democratic transitions 33 to grapple with historical legacies of 27 According to a famous U.N. definition, "[transitional justice comprises] the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society's attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international involvement (or none at all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof." The Rule of Law, supra note 1, at para. 8. 28 repression and widespread human rights abuses. 34 Born out of the euphoria of the immediate post Cold-War era, an era pregnant with the rhetoric of Francis Fukuyama's "end of history," 35 transitional justice was shaped not just by a preoccupation with accountability for past human rights violations, but by the notion that grappling with the legacies of the past would also help to facilitate a democratic political transition.
36 Implicit in these twin impulses and the ideology of the era was a sort of teleological or "stage-theory" view of history. 37 As part of this narrative, transitional justice mechanisms become a sort of secular right of passage symbolizing evolution 38 as countries progress from barbarism, communism, and authoritarianism to Western liberal democracy. Thus, viewing transitional justice as an apolitical "toolbox," a notion implicit in U.N. and other definitions, fails to account for the important historical and ideological underpinnings of the field. 39 While transitional justice is a dynamic and evolving field, these origins remain key to understanding some of its modern conceptual boundaries, assumptions, and blind spots, shaped as they have been by a particular faith in the ability of key liberal goods, including the rule of law, democracy, legalism, and human rights, to create peace. 40 Origins also help to explain in part the dominance of certain disciplines, approaches, and professional sensibilities in the field today. In the abstract, the 34 question of how best to respond to mass atrocities is one well-suited to a range of disciplines, including philosophy, history, religion, anthropology, and psychology, yet in practice the field has for the most part been dominated by lawyers and political scientists. 41 Given the dominance of lawyers in particular, it is perhaps not surprising that mass atrocities have been largely analogized as a form of mass crime, 42 and that the tools that have been marshaled in response have had a heavily legal character, often focusing more on retributive justice via formal courts and tribunals rather than other forms of justice.
43 This "prosecution preference," under which anything short of Western-style courtroom justice is often seen as comprised justice, is seemingly hardwired into the DNA of mainstream transitional justice. 44 It has been and continues to be persistent source of debate and global-local frictions. 45 Though truth commissions as a form of restorative justice are arguably an exception to the historic emphasis on retributive responses to mass atrocities, it has been argued that they are still fundamentally rooted in Western modes of truth telling and traditions of public confession and may not be appropriate in cultures with a different historical grounding. 46 Other items routinely considered as among the standard tools of transitional justice such as reparations, which could be considered a limited form of distributive justice, have in practice been given comparatively little emphasis and funding in many transitional processes. As a thought experiment, Arthur observes, one might consider the possible orientation of theory and praxis if the intellectual origins of transitional justice had been rooted in paradigmatic transitions to socialism and the dominant disciplines had been history and developmental economics. 48 While it is impossible to say for sure, it seems likely that the perceived dilemmas and preoccupations, together with the tools marshaled to address them would look considerably different. As an example, one could note the historic preoccupation of transitional justice with civil and political rights rather than economic and social rights, with acts of egregious physical violence such as murder, torture, and rape, rather than equally devastating acts and policies of economic and structural violence. 49 Greater attention to questions of distributive justice in transition-something that might have come more naturally if the field had different historical, ideological, and professional grounding-might well have entailed a focus on prosecutions for corruption and other economic crimes, together with a push for policies involving redistributive taxation or land tenure reform in the wake of conflict. Yet as the field has evolved, these issues have been largely pushed to the margins. 50 Thus, the Western liberal roots of transitional justice together with the professional orientations of those first drawn to the field helped to shape conceptions of both problems and solutions, circumscribing and stunting the nature of what 48 See Arthur, supra note 26, at 359 (2009). 49 There is a growing literature examining the extent to which transitional justice can and should grapple with economic and social rights and questions of distributive justice more generally. counts as an injustice, who counts as a victim, as well as the nature of and emphasis within the "toolbox" itself. 51 While the historical and ideological origins of transitional justice may have predisposed the field to privilege certain forms of harm and certain ways of responding to those harms, it can be argued that the field's roots in Western liberalism do not necessarily dictate internationally imposed solutions, "topdown" responses, or the more general marginalization of the local that has featured in many transitional justice interventions over time. 52 At the same time, the historic association between transitional justice and largely Western and legalistic responses to mass atrocity, when coupled with the field's grounding in international law and international human rights more generally, has served to privilege international institutions, norms, practices, knowledge, and expertise. 53 The early dominance of lawyers and legalism may also help to explain a tendency to view social change as a function of elite bargaining and top-down legal-institutional reforms. 54 The result is an emphasis on a constrained yet institutionally demanding understanding of transitional justice that some have argued is not consistent with the quality and capacity of state institutions in many post-conflict countries, to say nothing of cultural congruence. 55 Against this backdrop, the felt need for prosecutions and truth commissions "in conformity with . . . international standards" 56 often leads to the involvement of international donors, NGOs, and experts, placing a further thumb on the scales favoring the primacy of the global rather than the local. Indigenous or homespun solutions come to appear rough around the edges, second-best approaches to questions of how to do justice in times of transition. 57 Mirroring the savages-victims-saviors paradigm at the heart of some human rights advocacy, these dynamics produce a situation where the locals (savages) need to be assisted by international experts and institutions (saviors)-not just from the abuses they have committed against victims during the conflict, but from the "mistakes" locals would make in attempting to devise their own post-conflict solutions as well. 58 Internationally constructed categories of "perpetrator" and "victim" are essential to justifying such interventions. (Who, after all, will defend the rights of "victims" if not members of the "international community?") 59 The international assistance offered in such a context is projected as apolitical and technocratic, yet it carries heavy implications for the distribution of power (political, legal, social, etc.) in the post-conflict context.
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Of course, origins are not destiny, and the biases and blind spots of the early years of transitional justice need not necessarily be those of today. Thus, in seeking to understand contemporary challenges, unduly rigid notions of path dependency must be avoided. There are signs of limited but increasing openness to more diverse and culturally-grounded approaches to justice and a growing reconsideration of the need to address questions of economic justice.
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The field is also increasingly being shaped by perspectives from disciplines other than law and political science. Yet it is also true that once sets of practices and assumptions come to dominate a field, more than superficial change can prove difficult and slow going. As James Cavallaro and Sebastián Albuja have argued, the early years of transitional justice helped to establish a 57 See An-Na'im, supra note 39, at 197 (observing that "preference is given to a standard of justice that is mandated by the international community over indigenous or 'traditional' practices."). 58 ( arguing that a superficial consensus as to the goals of transitional justice can serve to mask a deeper level of politicization and debate, and that assessment of the tensions, trade-offs, and dilemmas associated with transitional justice has become difficult to the extent that they have been conceptualized in apolitical terms); Sriram, supra note 2, at 587-88 (discussing the ways in which post-conflict institutional reform strategies relating to the judiciary, constitution, and security forces may be seen by key protagonists as permanently cementing new power arrangements and therefore not as neutral or apolitical processes). 61 See Sharp, supra note 53, at 139.
"dominant script" that has gone on to be replicated irrespective of how suited it has been to some new contexts.
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Over time, the democratic transitions paradigm in which the field was originally grounded has become less explicit, and transitional justice is increasingly associated with the much broader field of post-conflict peacebuilding. 63 One could ask whether this newfound association will help to break through the conceptual boundaries and dominant scripts that have developed over time. 64 However, as many have noted, the field of international post-conflict peacebuilding is itself largely rooted in the belief that free markets and Western liberal democracies are the surest path to peace. 65 As I have argued elsewhere, the critiques of what has become known as "liberal international peacebuilding" share much in common with the critiques of transitional justice, including the idea that they both frequently involve topdown and state-centric interventions that serve to marginalize local ownership, agency, priorities, practices, and values. 66 There is reason to worry that the concerns that have given rise to these parallel critiques will be made worse, not better, by a greater association between transitional justice and post-conflict peacebuilding.
67 Thus, one should not expect global-local frictions in transitional justice to disappear as the historical and ideological origins of the field slip further below the surface. On the contrary, the lingering perception that transitional justice and post-conflict peacebuilding more generally share a common project to remake illiberal and imperfectly liberal states in the image of Western liberal democracies 68 contributes to the tendency of post-conflict interventions with a strong international component to produce some of the global-local frictions discussed in the following Part. 69 
II. CRITIQUES OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE PRACTICE VIS-À-VIS THE LOCAL
While the ideological and professional origins of transitional justice theory and practice helped to shape the conceptual boundaries of the field and to set in motion some of the global-local frictions experienced today, it would be too simple to attribute everything to those origins. We must also look to several decades of transitional justice practice to better understand the dilemmas of the local. Transitional justice practice is not a monolith, and where trenchant critiques have been raised there are always notable exceptions to the more general trend. 70 To be clear, much of the work of transitional justice-be it national-level human rights prosecutions or locally initiated and driven restorative justice practices-is carried out without significant tension with the global. 71 Yet a persistent critique of many transitional justice initiatives is that they pay insufficient attention to questions of locality and have been distant from the victims and the larger communities whom they were on some level intended to serve. Examples here will be largely drawn from transitional justice initiatives with a significant international component or where globallocal frictions have otherwise risen to the surface most palpably. International prosecutions, in particular, have tended to set global-local frictions in sharpest 68 71 At the same time, as I note in the following Part, great caution with categories of global and local is warranted. What may look like a purely "local" effort or initiative may turn out to have been in part initiated by internationals, and to have received international funding, framing, and technical assistance. Thus, in practice, there is often a blurring of categories.
relief, and will be examined in some detail before turning more briefly to the work of truth commissions.
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In many ways, the paradigm for modern-day international tribunals can be found in the Nuremburg International Military Tribunal (IMT), which was established by the victorious allied powers shortly after the Second World War in order to try senior Nazi leaders for aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 73 From the outset, the tribunal was dogged with criticism that it exemplified a form of victor's justice and made little attempt to secure what we might today call local ownership, drawing both judges and prosecutors from the ranks of the victors. 74 Indeed, quite apart from a preoccupation with such niceties, one of the chief policy debates in the lead up to the creation of the tribunal was whether to summarily execute senior Nazi leaders, with options ranging from 50 to 50,000 executions. 75 The trial option prevailed, however, and unlike some modern international tribunals, the IMT was located in-country, in Nuremburg no less, which was the ceremonial birthplace of the National Socialist (Nazi) party and site of annual propaganda rallies. The choice of a trial, as opposed to executions, and a symbolic location in Germany were intended to help generate a sense of defeat amongst the vanquished (i.e., the locals), but also to serve the educational function of conveying to ordinary Germans some sense of the scope of the atrocities committed by the Nazis in their name. 76 Although better than the alternatives debated at the time, there can ultimately be little doubt that the Nuremburg (and lesser known Tokyo) tribunals were an imposed justice and that the ability of local constituencies to have meaningful input into the process was limited to nonexistent.
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Even though the Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals generated some controversy, they helped spark an interest in the creation of a permanent international criminal court. 78 However, Cold War frictions soon made consensus on the parameters of such an institution impossible. 79 Nevertheless, the Nuremberg model remains important because it was in some respects resurrected in the mid-1990s with the creation of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR). 80 As the first major post-Cold War experiments in international justice, both tribunals served as a lightning rod for critiques and concerns relating to their engagement with the local. Neither tribunal was fully supported by the national governments most concerned, and the tribunals themselves were set up far from the victim communities and publics on whose behalf, at least in part, they ostensibly worked. 81 Focusing on this sense of almost imperial remoteness, one early critic argued that the tribunals "orbit in space, suspended from political reality and removed from both the individual and national psyches of the victims as well as the victors in those conflicts." 82 76 Beyond its symbolic value, Nuremburg was also chosen out of convenience since its Palace of Justice was large and relatively undamaged by the war. See id. at 154 (noting President Roosevelt's desire that "every person in Germany should realize that this time Germany is a defeated nation" and speculating that the aspect of the Nuremburg trials that may have most appealed to President Roosevelt was their educational value for the local population in terms of conveying some of the truth of what was done during the war). 77 The majority of the defense counsel were German lawyers. 78 See John Dugard, Obstacles in the Way of an International Criminal Court, 56 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 329, 329 (1997) (noting "[t]he enthusiasm generated by Nuremberg and Tokyo for a permanent court"). 79 Between 1949 and 1954, the International Law Commission prepared several draft statutes that would have led to the creation of a permanent international criminal court, but they were eventually shelved. See id. 80 See id. at 330. 81 The ICTY is located in The Hague, the Netherlands, far from the killing fields of Bosnia. The ICTR is located in Arusha, Tanzania. Unlike the ICTY, the Rwandan government actually asked the Security Council to create a tribunal, though it eventually cast the sole dissenting vote against the tribunal due to its location outside of Rwanda, its primacy over Rwandan courts, and its lack of ability to impose the death penalty. Its relations with the tribunal have ranged from coolness to hostility. Perhaps predictably, the distanced and isolated nature of the tribunals led to a lack of understanding of their work in both regions.
83 Nationals of the affected states were excluded from holding high-level positions on the tribunals, further eroding a sense of ownership, and this led to a situation where those doing the prosecuting and judging not only did not share the traditions of the victims and alleged perpetrators, but in many cases were almost totally ignorant about local history and culture. 84 Despite expectations that the tribunals would contribute to peace in the respective regions, it has been argued that, in the case of the ICTY, the tribunal's architects "gave little thought to how it would relate to those most affected by the carnage" ultimately threatening "the legitimacy of the court in the eyes of the society it was trying to help." 85 Given the misunderstandings and lack of local legitimacy, it is perhaps not surprising that some local constituencies have come to see the work of the ICTY as a form of victor's justice. 86 While the ICTR has provoked less overt hostility among ordinary Rwandans, many see it as a largely useless affair conducted by the international community for the international community. 87 Mounting criticism of the ad hoc tribunals eventually led to the creation of "community outreach" units. Such outreach and other community-centered objectives have always been ancillary to the primary task of securing convictions, and turning around people's perceptions of the tribunals' work has 83 89 These are disappointing results, and it is hard to see how a tribunal could contribute to broader efforts at reconciliation and postconflict peacebuilding when so many are not familiar with its work in the first place. 90 Lack of information likely also contributes to distortions promoted by those opposed to the work of the tribunals, including elites and former perpetrators attempting to sway public opinion against them. 91 Much has therefore been said about the potential for more and better outreach. 92 However, even a well staffed, well funded, and brilliantly executed outreach program can only do so much to bridge the substantial gap that can exist between local populations and international justice efforts. Outreach alone does little to address the marginalization of local agency, priorities, values, and practice in the set up and operation of the tribunals and carries with it a subtext of locals as passive recipients of international justice discourse and practice. Outreach does not, for example, change the fact that Rwandans are being judged outside of Rwanda by non-Rwandans using Western-style judicial practices that not all Rwandans agree with or understand. Further, this judgment takes place in an international tribunal that has primacy over national proceedings within Rwanda, the very creation of which was opposed by the 88 Rwandan government in the first place. 93 It also does not change the fact that defendants found guilty by the ICTR will serve their sentences outside of Rwanda in conditions far superior to that of anyone found guilty on similar charges by Rwanda's national courts. 94 Outreach does not change the fact that, at the end of the day, "neither the Rwandan government nor the international community has solicited the views of the Rwandan population" regarding how justice should best be achieved in post-genocide Rwanda. 95 Thus, while being better informed about a distant process is better than being wholly ignorant, it is still very different than having a meaningful say about the setup and implementation of justice processes that might deeply affect a community.
Of course, one could debate to what extent international tribunals should spend valuable time and resources trying to be more communicative, to be more connected to local communities, and to pursue wider social aims beyond delivering judgments. 96 There may indeed be cause to be modest in our expectations for what a tribunal can meaningfully accomplish given historic resource limitations and established bureaucratic incentives and priorities.
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Yet one danger in not doing a better job engaging in questions of locality than the ICTY and ICTR is a potential loss of legitimacy and a sense that the tribunals are little more than a "theoretical exercise in developing international humanitarian law."
98 While scrupulously run proceedings and eventual convictions are unquestionably important, a process viewed by locals with indifference (at best) to hostility (at worst) would seem to represent a lost opportunity when it comes to deeper projects of accountability and the rule of law associated with long-term peacebuilding.
Following the many challenges, successes, and failures of the ad-hoc tribunals, a new international tribunal model emerged, that of the so-called "hybrid" or "mixed" tribunals of Sierra Leone (Special Court for Sierra 93 See infra text accompanying note 81 (discussing the reasons for the Rwandan government's opposition to the creation of the tribunal). 94 The disparate treatment of defendants and those convicted has been a source of some resentment in Rwanda as it gives the impression that the "big fish" who orchestrated the genocide are being given better treatment than "rank-and-file" offenders. See Jennie E. Burnet This model was initially greeted with some enthusiasm, being thought to hold the promise of greater local legitimacy, greater norm penetration at the local level, and stronger ability for local capacity building-including strengthening domestic judicial systems. 101 In the literature, they are often presented as a sort of evolution from and response to the failures and critiques of the ad-hoc tribunals, 102 representing a sort of middle ground that harnesses the power and legitimacy of international law, remains connected to local expertise and populations, while avoiding the staggering costs of purely international prosecutions.
103 Yet closer study of the creation of the various hybrid tribunals reveals a process of quick decisions and tough compromises more than a conscious process of experimentation as part of an effort to improve upon past failures.
104 It should also be noted that the exceptional cost of the ad-hoc tribunals (which represented a full fifteen percent of the U.N. budget at the time of the creation of the hybrid tribunals) made the possibility of creating additional courts modeled on the ICTY and ICTR impossible as a practical matter.
105 Thus, the narrative of progress and institutional learning regarding the best relationship between tribunals and the local may not be as straightforward as once imagined. 99 A great deal has been written about the establishment, functioning, and failures of hybrid tribunals. See, e.g., McAuliffe, supra note 97; Cohen, supra note 88, at 5-6; Higonnet, supra note 92, at 347. 100 There have been slight deviations from this norm. Over a decade after the enthusiasm that greeted the first hybrid tribunals, evaluations of their success have become more circumspect. McAuliffe argues that some of the hybrid tribunals were often more hybrid in principle than in practice.
106 That is, far from being paragons of shared or local ownership, in the case of a number of the tribunals, "domestic authorities were largely marginalized or disengaged" while internationals dominated the process.
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This may have resulted in part from ambiguity over allocation of responsibility and in part out of a seeming reluctance by some national governments to share blame and responsibility. 108 Compounding matters, tribunals in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Cambodia have also been severely underfunded, particularly when it comes to activities such as outreach.
109
If the ad hoc tribunals orbited in space, 110 the hybrid tribunals have been described as a "spaceship phenomenon," with the tribunals' physical headquarters a strange and alien hive of activity largely seen as an irrelevant curiosity by the local population. 111 In practice, some critics argue, far from being the goldilocks solution some had hoped for that brings together the best of the global and the local, hybrid tribunals may sometimes turn out to be the worst of both worlds, joining the remoteness of purely international tribunals like the ICTR and ICTY with the shoestring budgets and occasional lack of rigor that can at times stymie purely local efforts.
112 Thus, while hybrid tribunals as a model continue to hold much promise, 113 some have argued that without a radical shift in priorities and funding, we may need to be modest in our expectations as to what they can accomplish beyond the fairly straightforward work of trying defendants and rendering judgments. Given that enthusiasm for hybrid tribunals has waned and additional ad hoc tribunals modeled on the ICTR and ICTY seem unlikely for the foreseeable future, the ability of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to better engage with questions of locality and to avoid some of the failures of the past becomes especially important.
115 Yet as a model, the institution created by the Rome Statute seems to harken back to Nuremburg and the ad hoc tribunals, suggesting, even in the absence of any practice, that the potential to generate significant global-local frictions would be high.
116 Indeed, with a headquarters far removed both physically and culturally from the conflicts and perpetrators it has addressed, the ICC's first decade of practice has been regularly punctuated by what one could characterize as a clash between global and local. 117 In Uganda, for example, some members of Acholi constituencies in the North have expressed a strong preference for using local reconciliation and reintegration practices to address crimes committed by former members of the Lord's Resistance Army rather than the ICC's retributive justice.
118 Regarding Kenya, a variety of African states and the African Union (AU) have attempted to pressure the Court to drop charges against Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, with the AU chairman going so far as to accuse the ICC of being 115 This is not to deemphasize the importance of national-level or "domestic" human rights prosecutions. Indeed, Kathryn Sikkink has shown that the worldwide crescendo of human rights prosecutions in recent decades rests upon a bedrock of national trials. See SIKKINK, supra note 29, at 21. 116 See generally Rome Statute, supra note 72. One obvious but notable distinction between the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC is that while the former were created by fiat of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), accession to the Rome Statute is voluntary, even if the UNSC retains the power to refer cases involving non-state parties to the Court under Article 13(b). In addition, provisions in the Rome Statute relating to victim access, participation, and compensation, as well as some flexibility as to where the court may sit represent a distinct improvement compared to the ad hoc tribunals, at least in principle. racist for only prosecuting cases in Africa. 119 Regarding Sudan, members of the African Union voted to refuse cooperation with the indictment of Omar AlBachir. 120 Taken together, "declining enthusiasm for the Court," particularly in Africa, constitutes a serious challenge to the future health and legitimacy of the fledgling institution, highlighting the importance of taking questions of locality seriously.
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It would be easy to write off some criticism of the ICC as a sort of rearguard effort by autocratic leaders and regimes to preserve some of the privileges and impunity associated with power. Indeed, as demonstrated in Kenya, support for the work of the Court may at times be higher among ordinary citizens than in segments of a self-interested political class, even if the views of the former are eventually susceptible to elite manipulation. 122 At the same time, one should note that the possibility of having a former president or senior official tried for human rights abuses in a foreign country, or before an international tribunal, has almost always generated significant tensions and feelings of ambivalence, from Augusto Pinochet, to Charles Taylor, to Laurent Gbagbo today. 123 Thus, one should expect that prosecutions of the type carried out by the ICC will generate controversy even in the best of circumstances.
However, though important, overemphasis of these factors would serve to ignore some of the deeper issues driving the global-local frictions that seem to plague the Court's work, issues stemming from the way global and local 119 responsibilities and powers are structured under the Rome Statute. Put simply, the very architecture the Rome Statute hinges on a delicate compromise between global and local sovereignty in matters of justice. 124 Under the principle of complementarity, sometimes described as the "cornerstone" of the Rome Statute, member states exercise primary but only conditional sovereignty in matters of justice, with power effectively ceded to the ICC where a member is "unwilling or unable" to prosecute a case itself. 125 The "unwilling or unable" standard echoes other emerging international norms and practices associated with the "responsibility to protect" and the US war on terror that are serving to reconfigure the relationship between global and local by replacing traditional notions of sovereignty with a sense of conditionality. While the principle of complementarity is in many ways a form of deference to the local, and stands in contrast to the primacy of jurisdiction exercised by the ad hoc tribunals, it also establishes a potential tension between the global and the local insofar as it invites the Court to stand as ultimate arbiter as to the adequacy of local effort and capacity. 127 The principle of complementarity would also seem to preclude local approaches to atrocity that differ from a retributivist approach in some instances.
ICC Delays Cases of William Ruto and Laurent Gbagbo
128 Consider in this regard the possible response of the ICC not just to a local pardon or grant of amnesty, but an effort to address offenses using restorative, "traditional," or otherwise alternative local practices of justice and reconciliation. 129 In instances without concurrent prosecutions, would such alternative approaches to justice be tantamount to "unwilling or unable" under the terms of the Rome Statute? While former Chief Prosecutor Louis Moreno-Ocampo has suggested that there should be great flexibility when it comes to lower-level offenders and the modalities of justice applied, the possibility for deviating from international retributivism when it comes to high-level offenders is less clear.
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Building upon the principle of complementarity and the notion of the primary responsibility of national governments, the ICC has no enforcement mechanisms of its own, but is completely dependent on state cooperation to carry out investigations and enforce its judgments. 131 Particularly in cases of self-referral under Article 14 of the Rome Statute, this can create special challenges to the Court's legitimacy as ICC intervention is played through the prism of local politics. Aside from deference, it should be noted that the principle of complementarity also acknowledges the reality that the ICC is a court of limited jurisdiction without the resources to address the great bulk of the world's human rights atrocities. 128 See Greenawalt, supra note 127, at 141-44. 129 Some scholars take exception to the word "traditional" as a description of such practices because it can imply that they are static and because it can also have pejorative implications. As noted in Part IV, infra., "traditional" practices used in the modern-day transitional justice context tend to be adaptations of much older forms of local justice and reconciliation practices. 130 132 Under Article 14(1), "A State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed requesting the Prosecutor to investigate the situation for the purpose of determining whether one or more specific persons should be charged with the commission of such crimes." Rome Statute, supra note 72, at art. 14(1).
Ugandan government resulted in the indictment of senior-level commanders in the Lord's Resistance Army. 133 This referral proved divisive for several reasons. First, the action arguably subverts local judicial and reconciliation practices in Northern Uganda where segments of the population would prefer the use of customary justice practices to the Western retributive justice of the ICC. 134 Second, because it would seem to turn a blind eye to violations committed by the Ugandan army at the height of the civil war in Northern Uganda, potentially giving the impression that the ICC is taking sides in a conflict rather than meting out impartial justice. 135 Similarly, in Côte d'Ivoire, former President Laurent Gbagbo stands indicted as an indirect co-perpetrator of crimes against humanity while crimes committed by forces loyal to his erstwhile political opponent, current president Alassane Ouattara, are largely overlooked. 136 In this and other cases, it may prove difficult for the ICC to serve as a credible check on state power while needing to tread lightly enough to ensure local cooperation. 137 Both the Ugandan and Ivorian cases illustrate one of the key challenges for the ICC and international tribunals more generally vis-à-vis the local. To stand wholly aloof and independent from the local invites mistrust and misunderstanding, ultimately undercutting the potential to do more than develop abstract international legal precedents. Yet the ICC is also dependent on the local for its day-to-day work, and this carries with it the possibility of playing into local political agendas that may further notions of victor's justice, besmirch the impartiality and credibility of the ICC, and play into narratives that would see in the ICC a Western project that picks winners and plays favorites.
138 What seems clear is that an international tribunal that ignores the complexity of local context (history, politics, culture, etc.) does so at its own peril. 139 Building the legitimacy of transitional and post-conflict justice interventions over time will likely require an exquisite sensitivity to context, and this may, as Greenawalt has argued, "call for as much, if not more, openended political assessment and balancing than for legal expertise." 140 While the dilemmas of the global and the local are perhaps most acute in the realm of international and mixed tribunals, truth commissions often raise similar issues, though perhaps in more subtle ways. Over the last thirty years, the truth commission has become a truly global phenomenon, with some forty commissions having been created, and new ones emerging on a fairly regular basis.
141 Though their mandates, composition, and powers vary greatly, most truth commissions attempt to accomplish three essential tasks: (1) diagnosing "what went wrong" in the lead up to the conflict or period of abuses; (2) documenting and analyzing the human rights abuses that were perpetrated; and (3) offering prescriptions for the future with a view to preventing recurrence of conflict.
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These tasks would seem to require an approach that is much more openended, context sensitive, and participatory than most tribunals. And indeed, 138 See Glasius, supra note 116, at 519 (arguing that " [o] n the basis of current indictments [the ICC prosecutor] could even be accused of exercising victor's justice . . . He has helped governments, including some that are none too friendly to human rights, to constrain rebels and rogue states under the banner of international law."). 139 For this reason, it has been argued that a "stakeholder assessment" employing qualitative interviews, ethnographies, focus groups, or population-based surveys should be carried out prior to a transitional justice intervention in order to discern local preferences, values, and cultural knowledge. See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 10, at 63-67. Nogales argues that under this model, the ICC prosecutor "would issue an indictment only if the population expresses a preference for international prosecutions in a distant location." Id. at 70. While efforts along these lines to gain a greater appreciation of context would be a welcome step forward in many instances, at the same time, in the case of a potential ICC intervention based on a self-referral by a national government, this would raise some serious questions about sovereignty in the context of international justice. Even where a government might not be fully representative or a population divided, one could ask whether it is appropriate for an international treaty-based institution to do an end run around a state party in this way. 140 truth commissions tend to be located in the affected region, largely staffed by locals, and typically involve the direct participation of a greater number of members of the affected public than a tribunal. 143 At the same time, as Rama Mani has noted, owing to restricted mandates and budgets, participation of the local population can still be quite limited, and the dissemination of reports can be erratic, incomplete, or even nonexistent. 144 Nevertheless, truth commissions have, by and large, been spared the trenchant critiques directed toward tribunals vis-à-vis their rather clumsy engagement with the local.
Yet there is also a sense in which truth commissions have become part of a global project rather than a local initiative, a box to tick on post-conflict checklist funded by international donors and assisted by a shadow staff of international consultants, rather than the result of a home-grown push for the particular type of truth and accountability that a truth commission can deliver. 145 One might consider in this regard the truth commission in East Timor, established not by domestic actors, but by a legal act of the UN's Human Rights Unit, 146 or the extremely close association between the International Center for Transitional Justice and the work of the Moroccan Equity and Reconciliation Commission (Instance Équité et Réconciliation).
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The result may often be a truth-seeking process that is not as attuned to local needs and realities as one might expect. Thus, Cavallaro and Albuja observe that in some respects truth commissions tend to hew to a "dominant script" that has been established over time not because it was necessarily perfectly attuned to each new context, but as a result of "repeated information exchange and consultations."
148 Funding from international donors, training workshops by international NGOs, and the occasional "technical assistance" provided by international consultants likely contribute to this phenomenon.
More fundamentally, anthropologist Rosalind Shaw has argued that the truth commission as a global phenomenon is rooted in Western modes of truth telling and traditions of public confession and may not be appropriate in cultures with a different historical grounding. 149 In Sierra Leone, for example, many people preferred a "forgive and forget" approach grounded in local practices of memory, healing, and social forgetting. 150 Similarly, in Mozambique, Mani argues, the desire to remember the truth did not even exist. 151 The prevailing sentiment seemed to be that "the less we dwell on the past, the more likely reconciliation will be," and traditional cleansing rituals were used to help reintegrate combatants into their communities and at the sites of massacres.
152 Assumptions about the purportedly universal benefits of verbally remembering violence that appear to undergird the work of most truth commissions, Shaw argues, may undermine and serve to displace these alternative approaches to dealing with the past. 153 This may explain why many Sierra Leoneans attending truth commission hearings appeared to be less than enthusiastic about the process, though Kelsall notes that some hearings may have had unintended benefits once locals started to transform them through the incorporation of a process of community ritual.
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From this, it can be said that many of the assumptions of truth commissions-including the notion that personal healing promotes national healing, that truth-telling promotes reconciliation, and that forgetting the past necessarily leads to war-even if valid in some contexts and cultures, may not hold in others. For these and other reasons, Mendeloff argues that one should not be so quick to proclaim the necessity of truth commission in the aftermath of violent conflict. 155 As with tribunals, the need for context-specific If an imperious global justice has in some contexts been stymied by a hamfisted engagement with the local that has served to blunt both legitimacy and effectiveness, making the global in some ways part of the problem, can it be that giving greater weight to principles like "local ownership" will lead to better solutions in the transitional justice context? Within U.N. policy literature in particular, the concept of local ownership has become nearly sacrosanct, with incantations to the local found across range of policy documents.
157 Some see in the prominence of the concept an attempt to paper over the legitimacy crisis in U.N. peacekeeping and peacebuilding, sparked in part by criticism emphasizing their neo-colonial and overly Western character. 158 But whatever the exact impetus, it is painfully clear that rhetorical tribute to local ownership has often failed to translate into meaningful changes "on the ground," making 156 See id. at 358-61 (2004) (outlining claims made with respect to the beneficial effects of truth commissions on social healing and reconciliation, justice, the official historical record, public education, institutional reform, democracy, and deterrence). the concept superficial and slippery in practice. 159 At the same time, because of the intellectual currency that the concept has achieved in donor and policy circles, it continues to be invoked by different actors in different ways to assert influence over post-conflict policy processes. 160 Bendix and Stanley, for example, observe that in the context of security sector reform donors demand local ownership to legitimize donor-driven policy prescriptions, local governments demand local ownership to secure their own power and influence, and non-state actors want local ownership as a means to give themselves access to the policy process. 161 Taken together, local ownership has become something of an empty signifier, employed by nearly everyone, while at the same time remaining vague and poorly understood. 162 Yet the opacity of the concept does not diminish its importance. As Donais has argued, "there are real limits on the ability of outsiders to shape, direct, and influence events within states emerging from conflict," meaning that there is no real alternative to substantive local ownership over the longer term. 163 International experts can run an international or hybrid tribunal in the short term and donors can fund a truth commission, but ultimately only "deep and locally owned social and political dynamics" can guarantee "well functioning institutions that produce substantive results." 164 Compounding matters, successful initiatives require the kind of profound local knowledge of context and culture that international actors almost never possess. 165 Yet even with ample awareness of context, interventions felt to be imposed "from the outside" are more likely to be seen as illegitimate, raising the possibility of backlash and ill will towards reforms. 166 In this sense, the struggle to give greater significance to local ownership can be seen as profoundly pragmatic.
More fundamentally, however, the concept of local ownership raises important normative questions, asking us to consider whether people have the right to determine their own destiny and make their own mistakes. 167 As Stahn observes, to even ask the question suggests a certain paternalism, 168 and could risk pathologizing and infantilizing entire post-war populations. 169 The normative pull of principles of self-determination and democratic control emanating from the concept of local ownership is especially strong when you consider that even with the best of intentions, errors of intervention are likely, yet it is the locals who must live with and bear the costs of these errors over the long term. 170 International actors, in contrast, will pack their bags and move on to the next crisis. In this sense, the concept of local ownership asks us to recognize that if the goals of post-conflict peacebuilding include classic liberal goods of democracy, good governance, and the rule of law, divorcing control and agency over a set of post-conflict initiatives from accountability and cost bearing is ultimately a self-defeating exercise in contradiction.
international peace and justice interventions tend to often occur in regions where there has been a profound breakdown in local political and normative structures and ordering. 173 In some cases, the formal institutions of governance have been hollowed out or have collapsed entirely, and much of the expertise that may have helped to re-build the country has fled, resulting in serious deficits in terms of capacity and technical expertise. 174 Complicating matters further, with the ethnic, political, and economic cleavages that often result and continue in the aftermath of conflict, there is often no coherent set of "local owners" in the first place. 175 Indeed, it has been argued that "[p]ostconflict spaces, almost by definition, are characterized far more by diversity and division than by unity." 176 In this context, post-conflict justice, like other interventions affecting distributions of power, can be utilized by post-war elites as a means of jockeying for gain, furthering partisan political agendas, and attempting to re-impose pre-conflict power structures that may be discriminatory or otherwise not consistent with international human rights standards. 177 Ultimately, therefore, as one set of waggish commentators put it, "the local ownership championed by the international community is not local ownership tout court but local ownership of a specific kind: the good kind." impatient and anxious for results. 179 At the same time, international standards for transitional justice interventions are institutionally demanding, tending to privilege technocratic expertise over deep local contextual knowledge.
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When coupled with global-local imbalances in terms of financial capacity, the end result is that all too often post-conflict justice interventions tend to place less of a premium on local ownership in practice than the global policy rhetoric would suggest.
Taken together, in many instances it may be said that true local ownership in the sense of full local agency and control is simply unrealistic. 181 In the context of international and hybrid tribunals in particular, it may well be impossible.
182 How, for example, could one truly have local ownership-again in the sense of agency and control-of a prosecution by the ICC, ICTY, or SCSL?
183 Even outside the context of such tribunals, global power and funding structures, together with the momentum and politics of the international justice advocacy movement, would seem to suggest that some degree of international involvement is inevitable as a practical matter.
Building on this, it has been argued that in some cases full local ownership may not even be desirable, and that some degree of international involvement is necessary in at least a supporting role, if not more. 184 In many instances for example, "local violent conflicts are no longer local or traditional in their causation or dynamics," having been transformed by "interventions of regional and global actors. (2012) (arguing that one cannot always assume that "more local ownership will always be desirable." Rather, "it is possible that in some contexts where it is selfevident that there is a need for an international criminal tribunal, it might be in the best interests of the situation overall for there to not be any particular effort to incorporate local ownership into the establishment process."). 183 In the case of the ICC, one might say that the opportunity for full local ownership effectively disappears the moment a state is deemed "unwilling or unable" to prosecute under the terms of Article 17 of the Rome Statute. 184 See Joseph, supra note 175, at 115-16. 185 An-Na'im, supra note 39, at 202.
problems" would seem to fail to capture the complexity of the situation. There are also arguments that some kind of global-local balance is required due to "capacity gaps" and the possibility of excessive parochialism. 186 Might it be, for example, that a better global-local balance in the trial of Saddam Hussein could have resulted in something less like a show-trial? 187 Similar weaknesses in the national judiciaries of Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia led, in part, to the creation of international hybrid tribunals. 188 Finally, outside of the courtroom, other local experiments in transitional justice such as Gacaca in Rwanda, described in greater detail below, can and do conflict with international human rights standards-raising difficult questions about whether and how to balance individual freedoms against principles of selfdetermination.
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For these and other reasons, while the local is often seen as one of the keys to the legitimacy of transitional justice initiatives, perceived legitimacy is in practice quite complex and there are no guarantees that a process will be seen as legitimate at any level simply because there is a high degree of local ownership. 190 In some instances, local constituencies might actually express a preference for an international prosecution, for example, due to perceptions that national courts are corrupt and lack independence. 191 In the end, therefore, too much local may raise as many questions as too much global. As Mazlish argues, the local cannot simply be used as a talisman to ward off all possible intervention. 192 The world over, someone's local has often given way to a larger local-with the dismantling of segregation in the Southern United Sates being one example-the results of which are hard to disagree with in the long term.
193 186 See Joseph, supra note 175, at 115-16. 187 Id. 188 See McAuliffe, supra note 97, at 8-9, 24-28; see also Stahn, supra note 146, at 318-20 (reviewing some of the challenges of national courts that may bolster an argument for some international involvement). 189 This dilemma is particularly acute in the case of Gacaca given the strong argument that it would have been impossible for Rwanda to comply with all international standards relating to accountability norms, victims' rights, and due process. 190 See Matthew Saul, supra note 182, at 434 (noting that an increase in local ownership could come with complications that can actually reduce legitimacy). Consider in this regard the example of Gacaca in Rwanda, which though locally owned in the sense of literal control by the Rwandan government, has minimal legitimacy in the eyes of many local constituencies. See Burnet, supra note 94, at 183, 188.
191 Observation based on the author's experience documenting human rights violations in Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire for Human Rights Watch. 192 Mazlish, supra note 25, at 98-99. 193 Id.
Simply put, while there is no alternative to local ownership in the long run, in the short-run at least, local ownership may at times be an impossible ideal. If this makes for a very difficult needle to thread in terms of post-conflict programming, it may explain why so much of the literature on local ownership does little more than say that it is both important and hard. 194 At the policy level, the tendency in the face of these dilemmas is to elide complexity, with local ownership becoming a sort of cheap bureaucratic trope to signal the need for local "buy in" and support rather than meaningful input or control. 195 Moving past this state of affairs in order to strike a better balance between global and local requires that we look more deeply into constructions of "global" and "local."
IV. STRIKING A BETTER BALANCE BETWEEN GLOBAL AND LOCAL
For all of their importance, there is a sense in which the dilemmas of the global and the local are false dilemmas created by rigid intellectual categories. 196 As Goodale has observed, outside of the academic and policy literature, there is no place called "local" or "global"-any more than there is an "international plane," an "international community," or places called "on the ground" and "in the field," yet these concepts are often spoken of as if they actually existed. 197 The global-local binary is also problematic insofar as it implies that there are only two levels at which social processes emerge or unfold, and insofar as it implicitly invokes a normative hierarchy and teleology. 198 Thus, both categories tend to essentialize and depoliticize sets of actors that are neither ideologically monolithic nor politically homogenous. For these and other reasons, some scholars have questioned the value of the concept of the local, arguing instead for more complicated notions of "glocality" and "translocality."
Despite these problems, the global-local distinction remains a central theme in human rights discourse, and is useful for its ability to underscore power asymmetries in the transitional justice context. 200 Similarly, as a policy trope and as an ideal, the concept of the local can provide an important counterweight to the centralizing and universalizing tendencies of transitional justice and liberal international peacebuilding more generally. 201 There may therefore be times when it is useful to categorize and essentialize to avoid pushing power differentials to the background, somewhat in keeping with Spivak's concept of "strategic essentialisms." 202 Thus, concepts of the local and the global retain utility for purposes of both analysis and policymaking, even if they do not accurately describe the full complexity of all transitional justice processes as they emerge and unfold. Working through the dilemmas of the local therefore requires a complicated analytical tightrope act. On the one hand, the global-local binary remains a useful construct for the reasons articulated. At the same time, understanding the complexity of global-local dynamics requires some deconstruction and destabilization, breaking down simple binary notions.
The analytical utility of breaking down simple binary notions of local and global can be illustrated by examining the Gacaca process in Rwanda. 203 arrests of suspected génocidaires in the years that followed the 1994 genocide, Rwanda's prison population swelled to well over 130,000. 205 These figures grossly overwhelmed the capacity of Rwanda's legal system, creating the very realistic possibility that thousands of individuals would either die in Rwanda's severely overcrowded prisons before they would be granted a trial, or need to be released without trial. 206 This led to pressure from a variety of actors to solve a very palpable human rights problem, and the idea adapting Gacaca to address genocide-related crimes emerged.
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While its exact provenance is somewhat murky, the idea of using Gacaca may have arisen out of a conversation between a researcher for Human Rights Mission and some professors from the National University of Butare. 208 Alternatively, Oomen points to "evidence that it was representatives of the donor community who first raised the idea."
209 Others point to a 1996 report by the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights, which concluded that Gacaca might play a role in dealing with genocide-related crimes, but only as a sort of truth-seeking adjunct to the work of tribunals or a community reconciliation mechanism that should be buffered from too much government interference.
210 Whatever the precise origins, the idea of drafting Gacaca into national service to address Rwanda's post-genocide justice challenges was eagerly seized upon by the Rwandan government and members of the international donor community.
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As adopted and adapted, the Gacaca of "tradition" was effectively transformed by the Rwandan government from a relatively informal community-driven conflict-resolution mechanism to a modernized and formalized public punitive justice institution backed by the power of the state. 212 212 In describing the ways in which Gacaca was adapted, I do not mean to suggest that its pre-genocide or "traditional" form was static. As noted by Luc Huyse, "traditional techniques, in Rwanda and in other African post-conflict countries, have been greatly altered in form and substances by the impact of colonization, modernization, and civil war." Luc Huyse, Introduction: Tradition-based Approaches in Peacemaking, Transitional Justice, and Reconciliation Policies, in TRADITIONAL JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION AFTER murder, or other serious crimes, it was adapted to complex circumstances involving mass atrocities and genocide. 213 This proved especially troubling to international human rights groups who questioned the lack of protections for the accused, minimal training for Gacaca judges, and issues of corruption, among other things. 214 Despite some of the controversy, Gacaca was initially welcomed by many outside Rwanda as a creative and pragmatic means to address a troubling backlog of cases relating to the 1994 genocide. 215 It also appeared to enjoy widespread support by ordinary Rwandans. 216 From a distance, it seemed to be the embodiment of a homegrown, locally owned, culturally embedded process-a Rwandan solution to Rwandan problems-yet this obfuscates some of the complex reality. 217 As noted, while loosely based on a traditional dispute resolution process and championed by the Rwandan government as the only possible solution, the impetus for Gacaca also owes much to discussion generated by Rwandan scholars, international human rights activists, and U.N. reports, to say nothing of sustained pressure from international NGOs and other entities to address Rwanda's serious prison overcrowding problem. It was carried out in large part as a result of support from international donors.
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What was presented as "traditional" and "community based" was really a hybrid that moved "back and forth between" historical origins and capture by the nation state. 219 Thus, to adopt the neologism of some scholars, it might VIOLENT CONFLICT: LEARNING FROM AFRICAN EXPERIENCES 1, 6-7 (Luc Huyse & Mark Salter eds., 2008). In this sense, the label "traditional" is potentially problematic insofar as it suggests a practice not subject to constant change. See id. at 7. Bert Ingelare argues that the "new" Gacaca is such a radical departure from the "old" that it represents an "invented tradition." Ingelare, supra note 211, at 32. Others have suggested terms such as "reinvented tradition" and "neo-traditional." 213 See Waldorf, supra note 205, at 48 (noting that "traditional gacaca generally did not treat cattle theft, murder, or other serious crimes, which were handled by chiefs or the king's representatives"). 214 indeed be correct to say that the origins and unfolding of the Gacaca process were very much "glocal" or "translocal." 220 In this way, the emergence and shaping of transitional justice processes might be seen as part of a continued dialectical process between multiple "levels"-global, regional, national, and community. Simple categories of global and local fail to capture this complexity.
The complex reality of transitional justice processes only serves to further illustrate just how problematic simple notions of local ownership really are. Just as the global-local binary must be questioned and blurred, making better sense of global-local dilemmas and interactions also requires us to break down and unpack concepts like "local ownership" into constituent parts. In practice, I argue, the term has become a sort-of catch all for concerns relating to actual control (agency, decision making, funding), process (whether a transitional justice initiative is "bottom-up," participatory or homegrown, being shaped by input from "the grassroots," or "top-down" and imposed; whether it is driven by the state or "the community"), and substance (whether a transitional justice initiative honors and resonates with local values and practices). While the control, process, and substance dimensions of local ownership are in practice often going to be highly related, it may not be necessary to satisfy concerns relating to all three for a transitional justice program to be perceived as legitimate. For example, hypothetically, a U.N. or otherwise "externally" controlled and funded program might be seen as legitimate by many local constituencies if it were heavily shaped by a bottom-up participatory process that put local priorities and practices at the heart of the program. In contrast, a transitional justice program might be fully controlled by a national government or other locals, and yet still be part of a state-centric solution imposed from the top-down upon local peasant communities without significant input, and ultimately be seen by many locals as lacking legitimacy.
Both hypotheticals presented here would seem to suggest that the process dimension of local ownership is especially key to the design of transitional justice interventions, not simply because process can help to generate feelings of (il)legitimacy, but also because, in practice, satisfying process concerns may tend to lead to transitional justice modalities that hit positive notes on the substance axis. 221 At the same time, undue focus on the process dimension alone is potentially problematic as it has been observed in other contexts that ideas like "participatory development" can easily be co-opted by states and international institutions to their own ends. 222 In the transitional justice context, it has similarly been noted that where efforts at "consultation" do take place, local communities are often asked for input into project implementation long after more fundamental questions of design and set-up have already been established, suggesting that process concerns are often treated as a shallow, technical exercise. 223 There is therefore a danger that as notions of process, including participation, are mainstreamed, they become yet another bureaucratic planning tool, muddying useful distinctions between genuinely people-centered, bottom-up processes and top-down, technocratic ones. 224 Finally, beyond process, one should not dismiss the importance of the control dimension, which-being intimately linked to the power and politics of transitional justice interventions-still plays an important role in global-local frictions and feelings of legitimacy.
By offering this schema, the intent is not to suggest that categories of control, process, and substances are in any way definitive, or that local ownership could not be broken down into alternative or additional categories. The key point is that thinking of local ownership multi-dimensionally based on the unique history of each particular context is a much more useful exercise than the loose sloganeering that often takes place around the concept today. Again, the Gacaca process serves as a useful real-world illustration of some of these complex dynamics.
At the most superficial level, the Gacaca process was very much "locally owned" as compared to the ICTR, for example, in the sense that formal control was retained by Rwandans. Yet to end there would be to confuse local ownership with ownership by the national government, a distinction that is potentially problematic in a context where the government cannot be assumed to represent many local constituencies or to be subject to checks and balances if it fails to consider their input. 225 The results of the Gacaca process illustrate that this kind of national ownership alone will often not be sufficient to create legitimacy in the eyes of many local constituencies. 226 Thus, the process dimension of local ownership, including whether a transitional justice initiative is carried out in a manner that is "bottom-up," drawing upon meaningful input and participation by affected communities, remains critical. 227 While the Gacaca process certainly involved a lot of participation by ordinary Rwandans in the hearings themselves, attendance at Gacaca hearings eventually dwindled and had to be coerced, and Rwandans had little space to contest dimensions of the larger Gacaca process itself. 228 Thus, there was a very real sense in which the process was imposed from the top-down (with the top being Kigali rather than New York or Geneva). 229 Beyond control and process, there is also a substantive dimension to questions of local ownership, including the extent to which a transitional justice initiative honors and resonates with local values and practices. Even on this score, the Gacaca process receives mixed results. While initially greeted with enthusiasm by the Rwandan population as a distinctively Rwandan approach to post-conflict justice in contrast with the remote and Western ICTR, many Rwandans were ultimately alienated by the process and felt that it lacked legitimacy. 230 In many respects, the process appeared to be more in tune with national (or government) values and priorities than community-based ones in the sense that it was engineered to reinforce longstanding partisan narratives favored by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) political party by excluding crimes committed by the RPF from the Gacaca process. 231 Thus, Gacaca illustrates that adapting the trappings of local practices, traditions, and rituals alone is not sufficient to generate a sense of legitimacy and good will toward a transitional justice program.
With the process concluded as of 2012, Gacaca leaves an ambiguous legacy. 232 While it constitutes an important experiment in post-conflict justice programming, its glaring gaps and deficiencies also serve as something of a cautionary tale. 233 Initially projected as an exemplar of local ownership in transitional justice, Gacaca was in practice another top-down, state-based solution imposed on affected communities, and ultimately suffered a loss of legitimacy as a result. 234 Given the authoritarian political climate in Rwanda, this should not be surprising. 235 Rather than transcending Rwanda's postgenocide political culture, Gacaca was simply played out through its prism. 236 At a deeper level, Gacaca illustrates the almost inescapable pull of both universalism and particularism in transitional justice processes, with notions of what it means to do justice in the aftermath of conflict invariably shaped by contested global and local standards. 237 More than that, however, it represents a clash of purportedly universal commitments, between liberal internationalism and international human rights, on the one hand, and conceptions of local autonomy, self-determination, and sovereignty on the other. Given the seeming inevitability of these competing forces in many transitional justice interventions, the disappointments and politics of Gacaca point not to the need to abandon alternative or "hybrid" approaches to post-conflict justice, but to consider possibilities that offer a better balance, including global-local balance, along the multiple axes of local ownership: control, process, and substance. 238 place greater emphasis on the local or non-Western, 243 requiring instead a more fundamental re-consideration of what it means to "do justice" in times of transition. 244 After all, it would be all too easy for mainstream transitional justice programs and professionals to embrace the local to the extent that it resonates with and resembles Western norms and institutions, using the trappings of the local in an attempt to boost legitimacy and buy-in to a larger set of projects. 245 Yet this would represent at best a form of co-option, a leveraging of the local only insofar as it stands in conformity with the global.
In the end, giving more than rhetorical weight to principles of local ownership in matters of post-conflict justice will require a significant "margin of appreciation" 246 and acceptance of an at-times uncomfortable pluralism 247 forcing us to stand on that tenuous yet inevitable middle ground between universalism and relativism. 248 However, striking a global-local balance also means that one particular local will at times have to give way to a larger local. 249 This reflects the simple recognition that neither global nor local dimensions of justice holds a monopoly on emancipatory projects, possibilities, and wisdom. [Vol. 29 CONCLUSION Dilemmas of the global and the local are now firmly entwined in transitional justice narratives, sticky strands that we can neither remove nor let go. Those dilemmas call on us to interrogate the historical and ideological origins of the field, grounded as it has been in Western liberalism and legalism, and may even point to the need to abandon traditional paradigms of "transition" altogether. 250 While one should avoid simplistic notions of path dependency, an examination of origins remains useful in helping to identify some of the lingering assumptions and blind spots that have in part helped to generate many of the global-local frictions so often associated with transitional justice interventions today.
At one level, attempts to resolve or at least manage these dilemmas reflect a healthy pragmatism and acknowledgement that transitional justice efforts are unlikely to contribute to larger aims of post-conflict reconstruction if they are not embraced by those who have to live with them, making questions of legitimacy and sustainability paramount. Yet beyond pragmatism, increasing attention paid to concepts like local ownership may reflect a deeper ambivalence with the imperiousness of international justice and some measure of discomfort with the sotto voce imperialism of liberal international peacebuilding more generally. 251 Few Western countries or world powers, for example, would accept some of the more intrusive dimensions of international justice. At the same time, the local also inspires another sort of moral ambivalence. Global institutions now insist that the local must be given "due regard," but wring hands over where due regard must give way to international standards and best practices. 252 In the end, the dilemmas of the global and the local therefore express tensions between different normative commitments, between liberal internationalism and international human rights on the one hand, and principles of local sovereignty and autonomy on the other.
Yet if we are to do more than repeat that addressing the dilemmas of the global and local is both important and hard, we must start by questioning simple categories and narratives of global and local, coming to understand 250 See generally An-Na'im, supra note 39, at 197. 251 See Uvin, supra note 14, at 186 (arguing that "[t]aken to its extreme, the new post-conflict agenda, then, amounts to a license for interventionism so deep and unchecked it resembles colonialism"). 252 For an argument that so-called "best practices" tend to promote an undesirable uniformity and bias interventions towards the global rather than the local, see generally Warren transitional justice processes instead as part of a more complicated dialectical process that moves between multiple levels. At the same time, we must carefully parse what we mean by local ownership. The normative currency of the local is now such that concepts like local ownership can be used as a legitimate shield-as a form of resistance to the hegemony of liberal international peacebuilding and a way to carve out a legitimate sphere of autonomy in matters of post-conflict justice-but also as a talisman by enterprising elites who would seek donor dollars while furthering their own partisan political agendas. 253 Coming to understand local ownership along its multiple dimensions or axes-including control, process, and substancemight help to clarify thinking in crafting future experiments in transitional justice. Such experiments will hopefully build upon more equitable globallocal partnerships, reflecting an acceptance of genuine practices of hybridity that take us beyond the self-imposed parameters of the transitional justice "toolbox."
